Intrinsic Heterogeneity in Expectation Formation by Branch, William A. & Evans, George W., 1949-
Intrinsic Heterogeneity in Expectation Formation∗
William A. Branch
College of William and Mary
George W. Evans
University of Oregon
May 16, 2003
Abstract
We introduce the concept of a Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium to dynamic
macroeconomics. Agents choose between a list of misspeciﬁed econometric
models and base their selection on relative forecast performance. A Misspeciﬁ-
cation Equilibrium is an equilibrium stochastic process in which agents forecast
optimally given their choices, with the forecasting model parameters and pre-
dictor proportions endogenously determined. For appropriate conditions on the
exogenous driving process and the degree of feedback of expectations, the Mis-
speciﬁcation Equilibrium will exhibit Intrinsic Heterogeneity. With Intrinsic
Heterogeneity more than one misspeciﬁed model receives positive weight in the
distribution of predictors across agents, even in the neoclassical limit in which
only the most successful predictors are used.
JEL Classiﬁcations: C62; D83; D84; E30
Key Words: Cobweb model, heterogeneous beliefs, adaptive learning, ratio-
nal expectations.
1 Introduction
Despite its dominance in dynamic macroeconomic models, the Rational Expectations
Hypothesis has limitations. A frequently cited drawback to the rational expecta-
tions approach is that in eﬀect it assumes that agents know the underlying economic
structure. In response to this criticism one popular alternative is to model agents
as econometricians (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). This adaptive learning approach
∗
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typically assumes agents have a correctly speciﬁed model with unknown parameters.
Agents then use a reasonable estimator to obtain their coeﬃcient estimates. In many
models these beliefs converge to rational expectations.
In practice, however, econometricians often misspecify their models. Economic
forecasters who use VAR’s purposely limit the number of variables and the number
of lags because of degree of freedom problems. If agents are expected to behave like
econometricians then they can also be expected to misspecify their models. (Evans
and Honkapohja 2001, Chapter 13) consider models with agents underparameterizing
the law of motion, and show the existence of a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium
(RPE) in which agents form their beliefs optimally given their misspeciﬁcation.1 The
issue of underparameterization is also emphasized by (Evans and Ramey 2001), who
examine the implications of optimally chosen expectations within the simple adaptive
expectations class.
In this paper we examine expectation formation in an environment where agents
must forecast using an underparameterized econometric model. More speciﬁcally we
confront agents with a list of misspeciﬁed econometric models, but, given this restric-
tion, assume that agents forecast optimally. Agents choose between these optimal
underparameterized models based on their relative mean success.
We investigate this approach in a linear stochastic framework, developing the
analysis in the context of the cobweb model. Because the economic model is self-
referential, in the sense that expectation formation aﬀects the law of motion for
the endogenous variables, the optimal parameters of each misspeciﬁed econometric
model depend on the proportions of agents using the diﬀerent models. We deﬁne a new
equilibrium concept, called aMisspeciﬁcation Equilibrium, in which these proportions
are consistent with optimal forecasting from each econometric model. We show that
for some economic model parameters and exogenous driving variables, agents will
be distributed heterogeneously between the various predictors, even as we approach
the limiting case in which agents choose only between the best performing statistical
models. We say that a Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium with such a property exhibits
Intrinsic Heterogeneity.
Heterogeneity in expectations has been considered previously in papers by (Townsend
1983), who takes a fully rational learning approach, starting with given priors, and
(Haltiwanger and Waldman 1985) who assume that a certain fraction of agents are
not rational. In adaptive learning models (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001) allow agents
to have diﬀerent speciﬁc learning rules. The seminal least squares learning paper by
(Bray and Savin 1986) also allows for heterogeneity in priors. However, these pa-
pers all assume an ad hoc degree of heterogeneity, and, with least squares or Bayesian
learning, the heterogeneity disappears in the limit. (Evans, Honkapohja and Marimon
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2001) allow for stochastic heterogeneity in learning rules, but again the heterogenous
expectations is only transitory.
(Brock and Hommes 1997) were among the ﬁrst to model heterogeneous expec-
tations as an endogenous outcome.2 (Brock and Hommes 1997) examine a cobweb
model in which agents choose a predictor from a set of costly alternatives. Agents
base this choice on the most recent realized proﬁts of the alternatives in a cobweb
model. If agents are boundedly rational in the sense that their ‘intensity of choice’
between predictors is ﬁnite (that is, they do not fully optimize), then there will be
heterogeneity and the degree of heterogeneity will vary in a complex manner.
Brock and Hommes illustrate these results in a particular case of rational versus
myopic beliefs. Because agents always react to recent changes in proﬁts their pre-
dictor choice will oscillate along with the equilibrium price. Our model is closely
related to Brock and Hommes. Like their model, we assume that the map from pre-
dictor beneﬁts to predictor choice resembles a multinomial logit. The multinomial
logit has proven to be an important approach to modeling economic choices,3 and has
been increasingly employed in recent work in dynamic macroeconomics. Extensions
of the (Brock and Hommes 1997) predictor selection dynamic appear in (Brock and
deFountnouvelle 2000), (Brock and Hommes 1998, 2000), (Brock, Hommes, and Wa-
gener 2001), (Branch 2002a, 2002b) and (Hommes 2001). (Brock and Durlauf 2001)
extend the framework so that agent speciﬁc choices depend on the expected choices
of others.
There are three important departures in our model. First, agents do not choose
between a costly accurate forecast and a costless unsophisticated forecast; rather,
they are forced to choose between equally misspeciﬁed costless models. Second, in
line with the econometric learning literature, each forecasting model is optimal, given
the misspeciﬁcation. Third, we assume that agents make their choices based on
unconditional mean payoﬀs rather than on the most recent period’s realized payoﬀ.
This is more appropriate in a stochastic environment since otherwise agents would
frequently be misled by single period anomalies. We will show that even if agents
optimally choose between these misspeciﬁed models heterogeneity can arise. Given
that agents base decisions on mean proﬁts it is not at all obvious that heterogeneity
would be possible if the ‘intensity of choice’ is large. Indeed, we will show that
instances of asymptotically homogeneous expectations also arise.
The main diﬀerence in our results is that, unlike previous work, we derive hetero-
geneity as a possible equilibrium outcome of a self-referential model in which agents
are constrained to underparameterize. In particular we examine the case in which
agents are fully rational except that they misspecify by omitting at least one relevant
2
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variable or lag. We focus on the cobweb model for two reasons. First, we want to stay
close to (Brock and Hommes 1997) in order to highlight the key diﬀerences. Second,
the cobweb model is the simplest self-referential model that eﬀectively illustrates the
intuition of Intrinsic Heterogeneity.
We obtain conditions under which there is an equilibrium with agents heteroge-
neously split between the misspeciﬁed models even as the ‘intensity of choice’ becomes
arbitrarily large. The intuition for this possibility is as follows. Suppose the cobweb
price is driven by a two-dimensional vector of demand shocks. If both components of
the demand shock matter for predicting prices, and if the feedback through expecta-
tions is suﬃciently large, then there will be an incentive to deviate from homogeneity.
If all agents coordinate on the same model the negative feedback through expectations
will make the consensus model less useful for forecasting. In these instances an agent
could proﬁt by forecasting with the alternative model. With Intrinsic Heterogeneity
the equilibrium is such that beliefs and predictor proportions drive expected proﬁts
to be identical.
The plan for this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the set-up in a general
cobweb model. We obtain an existence result for Misspeciﬁcation Equilibria, and
give conditions under which the model exhibits Intrinsic Heterogeneity. Section 3
extends and illustates these results for the special case of a process driven by a two
dimensional VAR(1) shock with agents choosing between two underparameterized
models. Section 4 shows that a Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium can be attained under
real-time learning. Section 5 concludes and describes future work.
2 Model
In this section we consider a self-referential stochastic process that is driven by vector
autoregressive exogenous shocks. We assume that agents’ expectations are based
on one of a set of misspeciﬁed models of the economy, each taking the form of an
underparameterization of the process. In the terminology of (Brock and Hommes
1997) we are in eﬀect treating forecasts based on a fully correctly speciﬁed model as
prohibitively costly, and those based on the misspeciﬁed models are equally and much
less costly. (For convenience we will normalize this cost to zero). Much previous work
has assumed a particular structure of agents’ misspeciﬁcation. We allow the choice
of the misspeciﬁed model to be endogenous.
We develop our model as a version of the Adaptively Rational Equilibrium Dy-
namics (A.R.E.D.) of Brock and Hommes (1997) in which we constrain agents to
choose between underparameterized models. Agents consider the unconditional ex-
pected payoﬀ of the various possible underparameterizations and select between them
according to their relative payoﬀs. Using the selected model they form their expec-
tations as the optimal linear projection given this choice. In our Misspeciﬁcation
4
Equilibrium, the projection parameters and predictor proportions are jointly deter-
mined and generate the equilibrium stochastic process.
We think that our emphasis on underparameterization is reasonable. The adaptive
learning literature has argued in favor of modeling agents as econometricians as a
plausible deviation from the rational expectations assumption. But, econometricians
misspecify their econometric models. Computational time and limits on degrees of
freedom make it impossible for an econometrician to include all economically relevant
variables and lags. Our model in eﬀect imposes such restrictions on agents, but
otherwise requires them to behave optimally. A striking ﬁnding of our framework is
that this can lead to the use of heterogeneous forecasting models.
We develop the model in stages. We ﬁrst show that, for given predictor pro-
portions, there exists a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE) in which agents’
misspeciﬁed beliefs are veriﬁed by the actual equilibrium process. We next allow
for predictor proportions to be endogenously determined, and show the existence of
a Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium. Finally, we formally deﬁne Intrinsic Heterogeneity
and state a condition under which this will arise.
2.1 Set-up
We consider a cobweb model of the form
p
t
= −φpe
t
+ γ′z
t
+ v
t
(1)
where v
t
is white noise. Although there are several well-known economic models that
ﬁt the form (1), we focus on the “cobweb” model in order to keep a close connection
between our model and (Brock and Hommes 1997). z
t
is a vector of observable
demand disturbances, which will be further speciﬁed below.
We normally expect φ > 0 in the cobweb model, which corresponds to upward
sloping supply curves and downward sloping demand curves. Bray and Savin (1986)
showed that φ > −1 was the condition for the model to be stable under least squares
learning. In this paper we focus on the negative feedback case of φ > 0 and leave
φ < 0 for future work.4
In the cobweb model ﬁrms have a one-period production lag. We assume that
ﬁrms have quadratic costs given by FQ∗
t
+ 1
2
G(Q∗
t
)2, where Q∗
t
is planned output and
F ≥ 0, G > 0. In addition we allow for exogenous productivity shocks realized after
production decisions are made so that total quantity is Q
t
= Q∗
t
+ κ
t
. Here κ
t
is iid
4
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work we will pursue the possibility of heterogeneity in that model.
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with zero mean. Firms aim to maximize expected proﬁts.5 Thus,
max
Q
∗
t
E
t−1
π
t
= E
t−1
[
p
t
(Q∗
t
+ κ
t
)− FQ∗
t
−
1
2
G(Q∗
t
)2
]
= Q∗
t
E
t−1
p
t
+ E
t−1
(p
t
κ
t
)− FQ∗
t
−
1
2
G(Q∗
t
)2
Solving this problem leads to the supply relation6
Q∗
t
= G−1pe
t
(2)
where pe
t
= E
t−1
p
t
. Then actual supply follows Q
t
= G−1pe
t
+ κ
t
.
Demand is given by
Q
t
= C −Dp
t
+ h′ζ
t
(3)
where ζ
t
is an m × 1 vector of demand shocks that follows a zero-mean stationary
VAR(n) process and D > 0. The ζ
t
process is assumed independent of κ
t
. Setting
demand equal to actual supply we have the following stochastic equilibrium price
process
p
t
= −(DG)−1pe
t
+D−1h′ζ
t
−D−1κ
t
, (4)
where, for convenience, we have expressed p
t
and pe
t
in deviation from the mean form.
It is convenient to rewrite the model in terms of an exogenous VAR(1) process.
Deﬁning
z′
t
= (ζ ′
t
, ζ ′
t−1
, · · · , ζ ′
t−n+1
)
we can write z
t
in its standard VAR(1) form
z
t
= Az
t−1
+ ε
t
for appropriately deﬁned A and appropriately deﬁned ε
t
, which is exogenous white
noise. Here z
t
is mn× 1 and A is mn ×mn. We denote the covariance matrix of z
t
as Ω = Ezz′, and Ω is assumed to be positive deﬁnite. Setting
φ = (DG)−1, γ′ = (D−1h′, 0, . . . , 0) and v
t
= −D−1κ
t
we can rewrite (4) in the form (1).
5
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t
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t
. That this is a reasonable assumption can
be veriﬁed by (4) below.
6
2.2 Model Misspecification
To close the model we need to specify the determination of pe
t
. We assume that there
areK econometric models available to form expectations and that model j = 1, . . . , K
uses k
j
< mn explanatory variables. The market expectation is given by the weighted
sum of the individual expectations
pe
t
=
K∑
j=1
n
j
pe
j,t
(5)
where pe
j,t
= bj′xj
t−1
, xj
t
= ujz
t
. The k
j
×m matrix uj is a selector matrix that picks
out those elements of z
t
used in predictor j and bj is k
j
× 1. Thus, k
j
is the number
of elements in z
t
that predictor j uses. We can rewrite (5) as
pe
t
=
K∑
j=1
n
j
bj′ujz
t−1
This set-up forces agents to underparameterize the variables included in their
information set and/or the number of lags of those variables. We believe this is a
reasonable approximation of actual expectation formation. Cognitive and computing
time constraints (as well as degrees of freedom) restrict the number of variables even
the most diligent econometricians use in their models. Our form of misspeciﬁcation
makes agents be (at least somewhat) parsimonious in their expectation formation.
We next specify the determination of the parameters bj. In a fully speciﬁed econo-
metric model, and under rational expectations, all variables z
t
would be included and
the coeﬃcients used to form pe
t
would be given by the least squares projection of p
t
on z
t
. Here each predictor is constrained to use a subset xj
t
of relevant variables, and
thus each predictor diﬀers from rational expectations. However, we will insist that
the beliefs bj are formed optimally in the sense that bj is the least squares projection
of p
t
on ujz
t−1
. That is, bj must satisfy
Eujz
t−1
(
p
t
− bj′ujz
t−1
)
= 0
Even though agents will never be “fully” accurate, they will be as accurate as possible
given the variables in their information set.
2.3 Misspecification Equilibrium
Given the belief process (5) the actual law of motion (ALM) for this economy is
p
t
=
[
γ′A− φ
(
K∑
j=1
n
j
bj′uj
)]
z
t−1
+ γ′ε
t
+ v
t
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or
p
t
= ξ′z
t−1
+ γ′ε
t
+ v
t
, (6)
where
ξ′ = γ′A− φ
(
K∑
j=1
n
j
bj′uj
)
. (7)
Here n = [n
1
, · · · , n
K
]′ and b = [b
1
, · · · , b
K
]. Given these equations and the parameter
orthogonality condition we obtain
bj =
(
ujΩuj
′
)
−1
ujΩξ. (8)
We now introduce the concept of Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE).7 An
RPE is an equilibrium process for p
t
such that the parameters bj are optimal given
the misspeciﬁcation. Note that, like a rational expectations equilibrium, an RPE is
self-referential in that the optimal beliefs depend on the vector of parameters ξ which
depend in turn on the vector of beliefs b. Thus, an RPE can be deﬁned as a process
(6) such that ξ is a solution to (7) and (8) for ﬁxed n.
Substituting (8) into (7) yields
ξ′ = γ′A− φ
K∑
j=1
n
j
ξ′Ωuj′
(
ujΩuj′
)
−1
uj
or
ξ =
[
I + φ
K∑
j=1
n
j
uj′
(
ujΩuj′
)
−1
ujΩ
]
−1
A′γ (9)
For a given n an RPE exists (and is unique), provided the inverse in (9) exists.
In the Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium, which we deﬁne below, n is determined en-
dogenously. Equation (9) gives a well-deﬁned mapping ξ = ξ(n) provided the in-
dicated inverse exists for all n in the unit simplex. We therefore assume that the
following condition holds:
Condition :  = 0 for all n in the unit simplex S = {n ∈ RK : n
i
≥
0 and
∑
K
i=1
n
i
= 1}, where
 = det
(
I + φ
K∑
j=1
n
j
uj′
(
ujΩuj′
)
−1
ujΩ
)
.
Condition  is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a unique RPE
for all n ∈ S.
We have the following result:
7
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Proposition 1 For φ ≥ 0 suﬃciently small, Condition  is satisﬁed and hence for
all n there exists a unique RPE.
All proofs are contained in the Appendix. In the next Section we demonstrate that
Condition  holds for all φ ≥ 0 in the case of a bivariate process.
We now embed the RPE into an equilibrium concept in which n is endogenously
determined by the mean proﬁts of each predictor. We will call this a Misspeciﬁcation
Equilibrium. Note that the proﬁts of each predictor depend on the parameters ξ
which in turn depend on n.
In order to discuss the mapping for predictor proportions we need the proﬁts for
predictor j, which are given by
πj
t
= p
t
(
φDpe
i,t
−Dv
t
)
−
1
2
φD
(
pe
i,t
)
2
= [ξ(n)′z
t−1
+ γ′ε
t
+ v
t
]
[
φDbj′ujz
t−1
−Dv
t
]
−
1
2
φD
(
bj′ujz
t−1
)
2
,
where, again, we have expressed proﬁts in deviation from mean form. Taking uncon-
ditional expectations of proﬁts yields
Eπj
t
= φDbj′ujΩ
(
ξ(n)−
1
2
uj′bj
)
−DEv2
t
.
Evaluating expected proﬁts in an RPE (i.e. plugging in (8)) leads to
Eπj = φDξ(n)′Ωuj′(ujΩuj′)−1ujΩ
(
ξ(n)−
1
2
uj′(ujΩuj′)−1ujΩξ(n)
)
−DEv2
t
. (10)
Note that Eπj is well-deﬁned and ﬁnite for all n, provided Condition ∆ holds so that
ξ(n) is well-deﬁned. It will be convenient to denote the function given by (10) as
F˜
j
(n) : S → R, for j = 1, . . . ,K,
and to deﬁne F˜ (n) : S → RK by F˜ (n) = (F˜
1
(n), . . . , F˜
K
(n))′. Note that F˜
j
(n) and
F˜ (n) are continuous on S provided Condition ∆ holds.
We now follow (Brock and Hommes 1997) in assuming that the predictor propor-
tions follow a multinomial logit (MNL) law of motion. Brock and Hommes consider
the cobweb model without noise where agents choose between rational and naive ex-
pectations. Agents adapt their choices based on the most recent relative predictor
success.8 This clearly would not be appropriate in the stochastic framework employed
8
(Branch 2002) shows that many of the qualitative properties in the model without noise carry
over to a model with small demand disturbances.
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here and we instead assume that agents base their decision on unconditional expected
relative payoﬀs.
The MNL approach leads to the following mapping, for each predictor i,
n
i
=
exp{αEπi}∑
K
j=1
exp{αEπj}
, (11)
where α > 0. Note that n
i
> 0 for α and the Eπj ﬁnite and that
∑
j
n
j
= 1. Again,
it will be convenient to denote the map deﬁned by (11) as
H˜
α
(Eπ1, . . . , EπK) : RK → S,
and clearly H˜
α
is continuous. The parameter α is called the ‘intensity of choice,’ and
parameterizes one dimension of agents’ bounded rationality. As α→ +∞ we obtain
the ‘neoclassical’ case of full optimization. We will be interested in the conditions in
which heterogeneity can arise in the neoclassical case. We remark that our choice of
payoﬀ function Eπj allows us to consider the ﬁxed point of a map rather than the
solution to a diﬀerence equation as in Brock and Hommes.
We now deﬁne the mapping
T˜
α
: S → S where T˜
α
= H˜
α
◦ F˜ .
Under Condition ∆ this map is well-deﬁned and continuous. T˜
α
maps a vector of
predictor choices, n, through the belief parameter mapping ξ into a vector of expected
proﬁts and then to a new predictor choice n. We are now in a position to present our
central equilibrium concept:
Definition A Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium (ME) is a ﬁxed point, n∗, of T˜
α
.
Applying the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem we immediately have:
Theorem 2 Assume Condition ∆. There exists a Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium.
In general we cannot rule out multiple equilibria. Let
N
α
= {n∗|T˜
α
(n∗) = n∗}.
For α ﬁnite and Eπj ﬁnite, it is apparent that all components are positive for every
ﬁxed point n∗. Thus, heterogeneity for ﬁnite α is simply a by-product of the MNL
assumption, which ensures that all predictors are used even if they diﬀer in terms of
their performance. However, it is of interest to know if heterogeneity continues to arise
if agents are highly sensitive to relative performance, so that they only use predictors
that are not dominated in performance. This leads to the following concept:
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Definition A model is said to exhibit Intrinsic Heterogeneity if (i) an ME exists for
all α > 0 and (ii) there exists n¯ < 1 such that n∗
j
≤ n¯, j = 1, . . . , K, for all α and all
ME n∗ ∈ N
α
.
It can be shown that a model with intrinsic heterogeneity arises whenever the
following additional condition is satisﬁed.
Condition P: Let e
i
denote the K× 1 coordinate vector with 1 in position i and
0 elsewhere. Condition P is said to be satisﬁed if for each i = 1, . . . ,K there exists
j = i such that F˜
j
(e
i
)− F˜
i
(e
i
) > 0.
Theorem 3 Assume Condition ∆ and also Condition P. Then the model exhibits
intrinsic heterogeneity.
The next section will present a simple example to illustrate our concepts. In par-
ticular we present cases in which Condition P holds and the model exhibits Intrinsic
Heterogeneity.
3 Example: Bivariate Case
To illustrate the properties of a Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium we will simplify the
model by considering a special case in which detailed results can be obtained. In this
section we assume that z
t
is a two-dimensional stationary VAR(1) z
t
= Az
t−1
+ ε
t
,
where A is 2 × 2, with eigenvalues inside the unit circle, and Eε
t
ε′
t
= Σ
ε
is positive
deﬁnite. Each misspeciﬁed model will omit one explanatory variable and thus K = 2
and k
j
= 1 for j = 1, 2. This is the simplest possible illustration of our framework,
and we will see that it can generate cases with Intrinsic Heterogeneity.
With bivariate demand shocks the predictors are now
pe
1,t
= b1u1z
t−1
= b1z
1,t−1
pe
2,t
= b2u2z
t−1
= b2z
2,t−1
Plugging these predictors into the law of motion for price and collecting terms leads
to
p
t
= ξ
1
z
1,t−1
+ ξ
2
z
2,t−1
+ η
t
(12)[
1 + n
1
φ φn
1
ρ
φn
2
ρ˜ 1 + n
2
φ
] [
ξ
1
ξ
2
]
= A′γ, (13)
where
ρ =
Ez
1t
z
2t
Ez2
1t
, ρ˜ =
Ez
1t
z
2t
Ez2
2t
,
and η
t
= γ′ε
t
+ v
t
. We remark that Ez
t
z′
t
is entirely governed by A and Σ
ε
.
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From the general results of the preceding section we know that a Misspeciﬁcation
Equilibrium exists for φ ≥ 0 suﬃciently small. For the bivariate case existence can
be shown for all φ ≥ 0. Furthermore, we will show that this equilibrium is unique.
3.1 Misspecification Equilibrium
If condition  is satisﬁed then this guarantees a unique ξ
1
, ξ
2
for each n′ = (n
1
, n
2
),
and a unique RPE. Since n
2
= 1 − n
1
, in this section we deﬁne the key functions in
terms of n
1
rather than n. Thus, in particular, if Condition ∆ holds then (13) deﬁnes
a continuous map ξ = ξ(n
1
).
Proposition 4 In the bivariate model, Condition  is satisﬁed for all φ ≥ 0. Hence
there exists a unique RPE for every n
1
∈ [0, 1].
From Theorem 2 it follows that there exists a ME. By developing the details we
can obtain additional results. The proﬁt functions are given by
Eπ1 =
1
2
φD
(
ξ2
1
(n
1
)− ξ2
2
(n
1
)ρ2
)
Ez2
1t
+ φD (ξ
1
(n
1
) + ξ
2
(n
1
)ρ) ξ
2
(n
1
)Ez
1
z
2
−Dσ2
v
Eπ2 =
1
2
φD
(
ξ2
2
(n
1
)− ξ2
1
(n
1
)ρ˜2
)
Ez2
2t
+ φD (ξ
2
(n
1
) + ξ
1
(n
1
)ρ˜) ξ
1
(n
1
)Ez
1
z
2
−Dσ2
v
,
and we deﬁne
F (n
1
) = Eπ1 − Eπ2.
In order to prove existence of a unique ME, we need to show that the proﬁt diﬀerence
function F (ξ(n
1
)) is monotonic.
Lemma 5 In the bivariate model, the function F (n
1
) is monotonically decreasing for
all φ ≥ 0.
We remark that it is possible to instead have a positive slope for the proﬁt dif-
ference function F (n
1
) when φ < 0. In this case it will be possible to have multiple
equilibria. Examples with φ < 0 are the focus of future research.
The predictor proportion mapping (11) can be written
n
1
=
1
2
tanh
[α
2
(
Eπ1 − Eπ2
)]
+
1
2
≡ H
α
(Eπ1 − Eπ2),
where H
α
: R→ [0, 1] is a strictly increasing function. Note that we use F and H
α
in
place of F˜ and H˜
α
to emphasize that in contrast to the previous section the domain
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of F and the range of H
α
is now [0, 1] instead of the unit simplex S. This will simplify
some of the arguments below.
Because Condition is satisﬁed for all φ ≥ 0, there exists a well deﬁned mapping
T
α
= H
α
◦ F . T
α
: [0, 1]→ [0, 1], which is continuous. From Lemma 5 it follows that
T
α
is a continuous, decreasing function for each α. It immediately follows that there
is a unique ﬁxed point, i.e., we have:
Proposition 6 Suppose z
t
is a bivariate VAR(1). If φ ≥ 0 the model has a unique
Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium.
Theorem 6 demonstrates that there is a unique equilibrium in the belief parameters
and the proportion of agents using the two misspeciﬁed models. It does not tell us
how agents are distributed between the predictors. Our main interest is in showing
that it is possible for there to be intrinsic heterogeneity. Unlike (Brock and Hommes
1997) who obtain heterogeneity as an automatic implication of assuming that α is
ﬁnite, we want to show that there exists cases of heterogeneity even in the limit as
α→∞. We now take up this issue.
3.2 Intrinsic Heterogeneity
The previous section established uniqueness of the misspeciﬁcation equilibrium. We
now discuss more speciﬁc properties of this equilibrium.
From the equations for expected proﬁt, it can be shown that9
F (1) ≷ 0 iﬀ ξ2
1
(1) ≷ ξ2
2
(1)Q, and
F (0) ≷ 0 iﬀ ξ2
1
(0) ≷ ξ2
2
(0)Q
where Q =
Ez
2
2
Ez
2
1
> 0. Furthermore, from (13) we have
ξ2
1
(0)
ξ2
2
(0)
=
(1 + φ)2 (γ
1
a
11
+ γ
2
a
21
)2
(γ
1
a
12
+ γ
2
a
22
− φρ˜(γ
1
a
11
+ γ
2
a
21
))2
≡ B
0
ξ2
1
(1)
ξ2
2
(1)
=
(γ
1
a
11
+ γ
2
a
21
− φρ(γ
1
a
12
+ γ
2
a
22
))2
(1 + φ)2 (γ
1
a
12
+ γ
2
a
22
)2
≡ B
1
These expressions assume that the denominators of the expressions are non-zero.
Recall that Q, ρ, and ρ˜ are determined by A and Σ

. The above results and Lemma
5 imply:
Lemma 7 There are three possible cases depending on φ, γ, A and Σ

.
9
The Appendix contains additional details of these derivations.
13
1. Condition P: F (0) > 0 and F (1) < 0. Condition P is satisﬁed when B
1
< Q <
B
0.
2. Condition P0: F (0) < 0 and F (1) < 0. Condition P0 is satisﬁed when Q > B
0
.
3. Condition P1: F (0) > 0 and F (1) > 0. Condition P1 is satisﬁed when Q < B
1
.
Below we give numerical examples of when each condition may arise.
Under Condition P0, F (1) < 0 implies that model 2 is always more proﬁtable.
Under Condition P1, model 1 is always more proﬁtable. In these cases we anticipate
homogeneous expectations as the ‘intensity of choice’ α→∞. However, if Condition
P obtains there is an incentive to deviate from the consensus selection. We have the
following result.
Proposition 8 Consider again the model with z
t
a bivariate VAR(1) and φ ≥ 0.
The unique Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium n∗
1
has one of the following properties:
1. Condition P implies that as α → ∞, n∗
1
→ nˆ
1
∈ (0, 1) where F (nˆ
1
) = 0. That
is, the model has Intrinsic Heterogeneity.
2. Condition P0 implies that as α→∞, n∗
1
→ 0.
3. Condition P1 implies that as α→∞, n∗
1
→ 1.
Proposition 8 establishes the possibility of Intrinsic Heterogeneity. We discuss
the intuition further below. This result is novel because, for high α, rationality of
agents is bounded only through their model parameterizations. Agents fully optimize
given their (misspeciﬁed) model of the economy. In Brock and Hommes’ A.R.E.D.
heterogeneity arises because of calculation costs and, most importantly, because with
ﬁnite α a proportion of agents do not optimize in the sense that they do not fully
respond to proﬁt diﬀerences. Only in a (nonstochastic) steady-state will agents be
evenly distributed across predictors.10 In our model, agents optimize given their
misspeciﬁcation, all predictors are equally “sophisticated” and costless, and Intrinsic
Heterogeneity can arise as part of a stochastic equilibrium. Most interestingly, it is
the self-referential feature of the model, combined with underparameterization, that
generates this heterogeneity.
10
This is because in (Brock and Hommes’ 1997) set-up all predictors return the same forecast in
a steady-state. Hence if a predictor is costless, then it will return the same steady-state net beneﬁt
as all other costless predictors. In our model, the nature of the equilibrium forces each predictor to
return the same mean proﬁt as α→∞.
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3.3 Connection to the Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Our equilibrium diﬀers from the Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium in (Evans and
Honkapohja 2001). There agents also underparameterize, but the law of motion is
imposed and all agents are homogeneous in their misspeciﬁcation. These expecta-
tions diﬀer from rational expectations by ignoring relevant information. Since all
agents ignore the same information in their perceived law of motion it is clear that
in equilibrium the parameters of the model will diﬀer from a Rational Expectations
Equilibrium (REE). In a Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium with Intrinsic Heterogeneity,
each agent uses an underparameterized model, but aggregate expectations are con-
ditioned on all available information. In principle, it is conceivable that a ME could
reproduce the REE. In this subsection we use the bivariate example to show that
this is not the case: the price process in a ME will diﬀer from the process in an REE.
Recall that
p
t
= −φpe
t
+ γ′Az
t−1
+ η
t
(14)
where γ is (2 × 1), A is (2 × 2) with elements a
ij
for j = 1, 2, and η
t
= γ′ε
t
+ v
t
.
Under rational expectations
pe
t
= E
t−1
p
t
(15)
An REE is a stochastic process p
t
that satisﬁes (14) and (15). The cobweb model has
a unique REE given by
p
t
= ξˆ
1
z
1,t−1
+ ξˆ
2
z
2,t−1
+ η
t
where
ξˆ
1
= (1 + φ)−1 (γ
1
a
11
+ γ
2
a
21
)
ξˆ
2
= (1 + φ)−1 (γ
1
a
12
+ γ
2
a
22
)
The parameters in a Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium are given by[
1 + n∗
1
φ φn∗
1
ρ
φ(1− n∗
1
)ρ˜ 1 + (1− n∗
1
)φ
] [
ξ
1
ξ
2
]
= A′γ, (16)
where n∗
1
∈ N
α
. We saw that a non-trivial solution to (16) exists for all φ ≥ 0 and is
given by[
ξ
1
ξ
2
]
=
1

[
(1 + (1− n∗
1
)φ)(γ
1
a
11
+ γ
2
a
21
)− φn∗
1
ρ(γ
1
a
12
+ γ
2
a
22
)
(1 + n∗
1
φ)(γ
1
a
12
+ γ
2
a
22
)− φ(1− n∗
1
)ρ˜(γ
1
a
11
+ γ
2
a
21
)
]
where  = (1 + n∗
1
φ) (1 + (1− n∗
1
)φ)− φ2n∗
1
ρρ˜.
Clearly the REE parameters (ξˆ
1
, ξˆ
2
)′ diﬀer from the ME parameters (ξ
1
, ξ
2
)′. For
example, consider the case when the random variables z
1,t
, z
2,t
are uncorrelated. Then
ξ
1
= (1 + n∗
1
φ)−1 (γ
1
a
11
+ γ
2
a
21
)
ξ
2
= (1 + (1− n∗
1
)φ)−1 (γ
1
a
12
+ γ
2
a
22
) .
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3.4 Further Discussion
The intuition behind Condition P and the existence of Intrinsic Heterogeneity is
subtle. In a cobweb model the exogenous shocks z have both a direct and an indirect
eﬀect on price. The direct eﬀect is simply the γ′z
t
term. The indirect eﬀect depends
on the way in which agents incorporate z into their expectations. It is the interplay
between the direct and indirect eﬀects that makes intrinsic heterogeneity possible. In
this subsection we illustrate the intuition through a simple example.
Suppose that the components z
1,t
, z
2,t
are uncorrelated. Then the RPE is given
by [
ξ
1
ξ
2
]
=
[
(1 + n
1
φ)−1 0
0 (1 + (1− n
1
)φ)−1
] [
γ
1
a
11
+ γ
2
a
21
γ
1
a
12
+ γ
2
a
22
]
Recall that
p
t
= ξ
1
z
1,t−1
+ ξ
2
z
2,t−1
+ η
t
Now set φ = 0. This is the case where there is no feedback from expectations to
price. In this special case
ξ
1
= (γ
1
a
11
+ γ
2
a
21
)
ξ
2
= (γ
1
a
12
+ γ
2
a
22
)
The parameters ξ
1
, ξ
2
are completely determined by the direct eﬀect γ′A. For φ > 0,
the RPE parameters are
ξ
1
= (1 + n
1
φ)−1 (γ
1
a
11
+ γ
2
a
21
)
ξ
2
= (1 + (1− n
1
)φ)−1 (γ
1
a
12
+ γ
2
a
22
) ,
and now depend both on the direct eﬀect γ′A and the indirect eﬀect of expectations
through n
1
and φ. Note in particular that as n
1
→ 1 we have |ξ
1
(n
1
)| ↓ and |ξ
2
(n
1
)| ↑.
For a ﬁxed φ the indirect eﬀect depends on n
1
. As agents mass onto a particular
predictor it diminishes the eﬀect of that variable. This is because of the self-referential
feature of the cobweb model that leads to an indirect eﬀect on prices opposite to the
direct eﬀect of that variable. This makes z
1,t
a less useful predictor than before, and
thus the z
2,t
component becomes more proﬁtable. The opposite happens as n
1
→ 0
and consequently there is a unique n
1
in which both predictors fare equally well in
terms of mean proﬁts. This proportion is the limit point of Intrinsic Heterogeneity.
Condition P places conditions on the indirect and direct eﬀects and on the relative
importance of the two exogenous variables. In our simple example of uncorrelated
shocks Condition P is equivalent to
(γ
1
a
11
+ γ
2
a
21
)2
(1 + φ)2 (γ
1
a
12
+ γ
2
a
22
)2
< Q <
(1 + φ)2 (γ
1
a
11
+ γ
2
a
21
)2
(γ
1
a
12
+ γ
2
a
22
)2
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where Q =
Ez
2
2
Ez
2
1
. When there is no feedback (φ = 0) there does not exist a matrix
A and Σ
ε
which satisﬁes Condition P. Intrinsic Heterogeneity does not exist in this
instance. Because there is no indirect eﬀect from expectations, and expectations
have no bearing on price, agents will choose the model that forecasts price best. As
φ increases, the range of admissible Q increases. Given A, γ and Q, condition P will
hold for φ > 0 suﬃciently large.
3.5 Numerical Examples
We illustrate our results numerically. Figure 1 gives the T-maps for various values of
α. The upper part of the ﬁgure shows the T-maps corresponding to (starting from
n
1
= 0 and moving clockwise) α = 2, α = 20, α = 50, α = 100, α = 200, α = 2000.
We set
A =
[
.3 .10
.10 .7
]
,
γ′ = [.7, .5],
Σ
ε
=
[
.7 .2
.2 .6
]
,
and φ = 2. The bottom portion of the ﬁgure is the proﬁt diﬀerence function F (n
1
).
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The matrix A and parameter φ have been chosen so that Condition P holds, i.e.
F (1) < 0. The proof of Proposition 8 shows that as α→∞
H
α
(x)→


1 if x > 0
0 if x < 0
1/2 if x = 0
and clearly this will govern the behavior of T
α
= H
α
◦ F . Figure 1 illustrates how as
α increases the inverse S-shape becomes more pronounced. The dashed line is the 45-
degree line and all ﬁxed points of the T-map will intersect this line. As α increases the
ﬁxed point declines from above .5 to about .22, which is the point at which F (nˆ
1
) = 0.
The Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium continues to exhibit heterogeneity even as α→∞.
Figures 2 illustrates how heterogeneity may disappear as α→∞. We now set
A =
[
.93 .10
.10 .2
]
,
so that Condition P does not hold and instead condition P1 is satisﬁed. For low
values of α some agents continue to use z
2
even though it returns a lower expected
payoﬀ. However, as α→∞ all agents behave optimally and the proportion using z
2
goes to zero.
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INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Figure 3 shows the role φ plays in the degree of Intrinsic Heterogeneity. This
graph depicts the T-map for various increasing values of φ. Notice that as φ increases
the ﬁxed point of the T-map moves further to the left. In this example, z
1
has a
stronger inﬂuence on the price than z
2
. When z
2
has a stronger eﬀect, the ﬁxed point
will move to the right.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Note that in a Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium, in a model with Intrinsic Heterogene-
ity, all predictors have the same average return as the intensity of choice α becomes
large. When α is ﬁnite there can be diﬀerences in the relative performance of pre-
dictors, but as α → +∞ the mean returns across predictor must converge given
our assumption of costless (or equally costly) predictors. Heterogeneity arises in the
costless case of (Brock and Hommes 1997) only in the steady-state in which diﬀer-
ent predictors make identical forecasts. Our results arise in a stochastic equilibrium
in which diﬀerent predictors produce diﬀerent forecasts, but achieve identical mean
performance, as α→ +∞.
4 Stability under Real-Time Learning
In this section we address whether the equilibrium is attainable under real-time learn-
ing of the type emphasized in (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). In a Misspeciﬁcation
Equilibrium agents misspecify, but their forecasts are the optimal linear projections
given their underparameterization. Furthermore, agents choose which component of
the exogenous process to omit based on unconditional mean proﬁts. We now sub-
stitute optimal linear projections with real-time estimates formed via recursive least
squares (RLS).11 We also assume that agents choose their model each period based
on a real-time estimate of mean proﬁts.
Prices now depend on time-varying parameters
p
t
= ξ
1
(b1
t−1
, n
1,t−1
)z
1,t−1
+ ξ
2
(b2
t−1
, n
1,t−1
)z
2,t−1
+ η
t
in which b1
t−1
, b2
t−1
are updated by RLS
b1
t
= b1
t−1
+ t−1R−1
1,t
z
1,t−1
(
p
t
− b1
t−1
z
1,t−1
)
b2
t
= b2
t−1
+ t−1R−1
2,t
z
2,t−1
(
p
t
− b2
t−1
z
2,t−1
)
11
For an overview of stability under RLS in dynamic macroeconomics see (Evans and Honkapohja
2001).
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where
R
1,t
= R
1,t−1
+ t−1(z2
1,t−1
−R
1,t−1
)
R
2,t
= R
2,t−1
+ t−1(z2
2,t−1
−R
2,t−1
)
The R
j,t
, j = 1, 2 are recursive estimates of the variances of the explanatory variables
z
j
.
Given these beliefs agents estimate the mean proﬁts associated with each model
Eˆπ
1,t
= Eˆπ
1,t−1
+ t−1
(
π
1,t
− Eˆπ
1,t−1
)
Eˆπ
2,t
= Eˆπ
2,t−1
+ t−1
(
π
2,t
− Eˆπ
2,t−1
)
The mean proﬁts map into predictor proportions according to the law of motion
n
j,t
=
exp
[
αEˆπ
j,t
]
∑
2
j=1
exp
[
αEˆπ
k,t
]
The dynamic version of the model exhibits real-time learning in the sense that agents
adaptively update previous estimates of their belief parameters and the mean proﬁts
from those beliefs. Agents now choose their model in each time period based on these
recursive estimates. We are interested in whether the sequence of estimates b1
t
, b2
t
and
predictor proportions n
1,t
converge to the Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium.12 Our aim is
to use numerical illustrations to show that the equilibrium can be stable under real-
time learning. It is beyond the scope of this paper to establish analytical convergence
results for this learning rule.
We continue with a particular parameterization that generated Intrinsic Hetero-
geneity in the previous section. We set
A =
[
.3 .1
.1 .7
]
, Σ
ε
=
[
.7 .2
.2 .6
]
,
γ′ = [.7, .5], and φ = 2, and simulate the model for 100,000 time periods. We set the
initial value of the VAR equal to a realization of its white noise shock, i.e., z
0
= ε
0
.
The initial value for n
1,0
is 0.82, a value that was chosen to lie away from the end points
and the ME. Initial estimated mean proﬁts are equal to the realized proﬁts under the
initial conditions. The initial belief parameters were set to b1
0
= 1, b2
0
= 2. The initial
estimated variances R
1,0
, R
2,0
are the identity matrices. We choose α = 100.
Figure 4 illustrates the results of a representative simulation. The top panel
plots the simulated proportion n
1,t
against time. The middle and bottom panels plot
12
Since we conduct the analysis numerically, we are being deliberately vague in what sense these
sequences converge.
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the simulated law of motion parameters ξ
1,t
, ξ
2,t
. In each plot the solid horizontal
line represents the respective variables’ values in the Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium
with Intrinsic Heterogeneity. As can be seen, there appears to be convergence to
the ME. Initially there is considerable volatility in the proportion of agents who
choose predictor 1. This volatility gradually dampens until the proportion approaches
its equilibrium value. The dampening is much quicker in belief parameters as they
approach their equilibrium values in a short period of time. Similar convergence
results were obtained for other parameter settings but the qualitative results were
aﬀected by α. For larger values of α it takes longer for the predictor proportions to
settle down near the equilibrium values. However, the system appears to be stable
for all α > 0.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
The intuition behind the stability is as follows. In our parameterization there is
a unique ME with Intrinsic Heterogeneity. Heterogeneity arises because Condition P
guarantees that under, say, z
1
homogeneity agents will have an incentive to mass on
z
2
, and vice-versa. For large α agents mass on the predictor that returns the highest
mean proﬁt. In our simulations the proportions of agents are initially well away from
the ME. This implies that one predictor has a higher proﬁt than the other. In the
next period agents mass onto that predictor. Because Condition P holds, in the next
period agents mass onto the other predictor. As the rapid switching occurs agents
update parameter estimates, which converge quickly, and accumulate data on relative
mean forecast performance. As they learn about mean relative forecast performance,
the volatility in predictor selection dampens and there is convergence towards the
Misspeciﬁcation Equilibrium.
In the light of (Brock and Hommes 1997) our results may seem surprising. How-
ever, in (Brock and Hommes 1997) the model is deterministic, the predictor choice
is between a costly stabilizing predictor and a costless destabilizing predictor, and
predictor ﬁtness is the most recent period’s realized proﬁts. The stability results in
our model are the result of agents looking at the mean relative performance of the
predictors using the whole history of proﬁts. This feature seems more appropriate
within the stochastic model we examine, and is a key feature generating our numerical
stability results.
5 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates how to obtain heterogeneous expectations as an equilibrium
outcome in a model with optimizing agents. Our set-up is the standard cobweb model
in which rational expectations was originally developed. We obtain our results with
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a discrete choice model for predictors, when agents are constrained to choose from a
set of misspeciﬁed models. As in (Brock and Hommes 1997) the proportion of agents
using the diﬀerent predictors depends on their relative performance according to an
intensity of choice parameter. As the intensity of choice increases agents will select
only the most successful predictors. In (Brock and Hommes 1997) heterogeneity
of expectations is a reﬂection of ﬁnite intensities of choice and disappears in the
neoclassical limit. One of the main contributions of this paper is to show that
heterogeneity can remain for high intensities of choice as a result of the availability
of multiple misspeciﬁed models.
Because of limits in cognition, knowledge of the economy, degrees of freedom, etc.,
we assume that agents must underparameterize by neglecting a variable or lag from
their forecasting model. The importance of misspeciﬁcation is widely recognized in
applied econometrics and one that we believe should be reﬂected in realistic mod-
els of bounded rationality. Although we constrain agents to choose from a list of
misspeciﬁed models, at the same time we require that the parameters of each chosen
model are formed optimally in the sense that forecast errors are orthogonal to the
explanatory variables of that model.
Our major theoretical contribution is to obtain existence results for a Misspeci-
ﬁcation Equilibrium within this framework and to obtain a suitable condition under
which heterogeneous expectations persists for high intensities of choice. When this
condition is satisﬁed we say the model exhibits Intrinsic Heterogeneity.
Our central ﬁnding that misspeciﬁcation can lead to heterogeneous expectations
is not at all obvious. If the intensity of choice is large, a key requirement for this
possibility is that the model be self-referential, i.e., that there be feedback from
expectations to actual outcomes. Heterogeneous expectations are not a necessary
outcome when the intensity of choice is large, but do arise under a suitable joint
condition on the model and the exogenous driving processes. We illustrate the results
in a simple bivariate model. In particular, we show that, ceteris paribus, Intrinsic
Heterogeneity arises when the parameter governing the self-referential extent of the
model is suﬃciently large. This surprising feature of self-referential models has not
been noted in previous work.
In this paper we have focused on the cobweb model. In future work, we will
examine the framework in a Lucas-type monetary model. The Lucas-type model
shares a similar reduced-form as the cobweb model, but expectations have a positive
feedback on price. Since the self-referential feature of these models is central, a model
with positive feedback can be expected to yield distinct results.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the matrix
[] =
(
I + φ
K∑
j=1
njΩ′uj
′
(
ujΩuj
′
)
−1
uj
)
.
The absolute value of the indicated sum has a maximum value when considered as a
function of n ∈ S. Hence for |φ| suﬃciently small [] is strictly diagonally dominant
(see Horn and Johnson (1985), p. 302) for all n ∈ S. Strictly diagonally dominant
matrices have non-zero determinants and hence are invertible.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose to the contrary that the model does not exhibit
intrinsic heterogeneity. From Theorem 2 we know that a ME exists for every α.
Since the model does not have intrinsic heterogeneity, then for all n¯ < 1 there are
inﬁnitely many α such that n∗
k
> n¯ for some component k = 1, . . . , K where n∗ ∈ N
α
.
Hence there exists a sequence indexed by sˆ such that α(sˆ) → ∞ with ﬁxed points
n∗(sˆ) satisfying n∗
k(sˆ)
(sˆ) → 1. It follows that for some i ∈ {1, . . . , K} there exists a
subsequence indexed by s such that α(s) → ∞ and n∗
i
(s) → 1. The expected proﬁt
functions F˜
j
(n) are continuous and hence for this sequence
Eπk(s)−Eπi(s)→ F˜
k
(e
i
)− F˜
i
(e
i
),
for all k = 1, . . . , K, where e
i
is the unit coordinate vector with component i equal to
one. However, condition P implies that there exists j = i such that F˜
j
(e
i
)−F˜
i
(e
i
) > 0.
It follows from (11) that
n∗
i
(s) =
1
1 +
∑
k =i
exp{α(s)(Eπk(s)− Eπi(s)}
.
Thus n∗
i
(s) → 0 as s → ∞. This contradicts n∗
i
(s) → 1 and hence the model must
exhibit intrinsic heterogeneity.
Proof of Proposition 4. We want to show
 = (1 + n
1
φ) ((1 + φ)− φn
1
)− φ2ρρ˜
(
n
1
− n2
1
)
> 0
or equivalently
 = φ2 (ρρ˜− 1)n2
1
+ φ2 (1− ρρ˜)n
1
+ (1 + φ)
The equation  is a quadratic concave in φ. Evaluated at the end points (n
1
= 0
and n
1
= 1)  > 0. The quadratic is maximized at n
1
= 1/2 and returns a value
of (1/2) = (1/2)φ2 + (1 + φ) > 0. Since  is concave and is positive at both its
extrema, we conclude that Condition  is satisﬁed.
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Proof of Lemma 5. We can rewrite (13) as
S(n
1
)ξ = A′γ,
where ξ′ = (ξ
1
, ξ
2
) and S(n
1
) is the indicated 2× 2 matrix. Diﬀerentiating we obtain
(dS)ξ + S(dξ) = 0 and
dξ
dn
1
= −S−1
dS
dn
1
ξ.
It is easily seen that
dS
dn
1
= φ
(
1 ρ
−ρ˜ −1
)
.
Somewhat abusing notation, it is now convenient to rewrite F (n
1
) as F (ξ(n
1
)). To
establish the result we compute dF/dn
1
= (dF/dξ)′(dξ/dn
1
). It can be veriﬁed that
(
dF
dξ
)′ = φD(1− r2)Ez2
1
ξ′
(
1 0
0 −Q
)
,
where Q = Ez2
2
/Ez2
1
.
Thus
dF/dn
1
= −φ2D(1− r2)Ez2
1
ξ′K(n
1
)ξ, where
K =
(
1 0
0 −Q
)
S−1
(
1 ρ
−ρ˜ −1
)
.
Here r2 = ρρ˜ with 0 ≤ r2 < 1. Computation of K yields
K(n
1
) =
(
1+φ(1−n
1
(1−r
2
))
1+φ+φ
2
(1−r
2
)n
1
(1−n
1
)
√
Qr(1+φ)
1+φ+φ
2
(1−r
2
)n
1
(1−n
1
)
√
Qr(1+φ)
1+φ+φ
2
(1−r
2
)n
1
(1−n
1
)
Q(1+φr
2
+φ(1−r
2
)n
1
)
1+φ+φ
2
(1−r
2
)n
1
(1−n
1
)
)
.
K(n
1
) is symmetric with K
11
(n
1
) > 0 and
det(K(n
1
)) =
Q(1− r2)
1 + φ+ φ2(1− r2)n
1
(1− n
1
)
> 0.
Thus K(n
1
) is positive deﬁnite and ξ′K(n
1
)ξ ≥ 0 for all ξ. The result follows since
dF/dn
1
≤ 0 for all 0 ≤ n
1
≤ 1.
Further Details For Section 3.2. Using the proﬁt functions derived above we
can ﬁnd
F (1)
Ez2
1
= −φD{(ξ2
1
(1)ρ˜− ξ2
2
(1)ρ)ρ+ (1/2)(ξ2
2
(1)−
ρ˜2ξ2
1
(1))Q− (1/2)(ξ2
1
(1)− ρ2ξ2
2
(1))}
F (0)
Ez2
2
= φD{ρ˜[ξ2
2
(0)ρ− ξ2
1
(0)ρ˜] + (1/2)[(ξ2
1
(0)−
ξ2
2
(0)ρ2)Q−1 − (ξ2
2
(0)− ξ2
1
(0)ρ˜2)]}
23
Thus, for example,
F (1) < 0 if
[
ξ2
1
(1)− ξ2
2
(1)
] (
Qρ˜2 − 1
)
> 0.
Using Qρ˜2 = r2 < 1 it follows that
F (1) < 0 if
[
ξ2
1
(1)− ξ2
2
(1)
]
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. Take part (1), which states that Condition P implies
Intrinsic Heterogeneity. We will establish that (i) for each α, ∃n∗
1
(α) ∈ N
α
uniquely,
(ii) ∃ {α(s)}
s
s.t. α(s) → ∞ ⇒ n∗
1
(α(s)) → nˆ
1
where nˆ
1
∈ N
∞
≡ {n
1
∈ [0, 1] :
for α→∞ n
1
= T
α
(n
1
)} and (iii) F (nˆ
1
) = 0.
Claim (i) that there exists a unique ﬁxed point n∗
1
(α) for each α comes directly
from Theorem 6.
Claim (ii) is that there is a sequence α(s) indexed by s deﬁned so that as α(s)→∞
the corresponding sequence of ﬁxed points from claim (i) n∗
1
(α(s))→ nˆ
1
. That there
exists a sequence α(s) → ∞ and a similarly corresponding sequence n∗
1
(α) follows
from claim (i) and since α ∈ R
+
there are inﬁnitely many such sequences. Theorem
6 used Brouwer’s theorem and Lemma 5 to establish that there exists a unique ﬁxed
point for each α. Hence there exists a limit to the sequence of ﬁxed points indexed
by s and deﬁne it to be n∗
1
(α(s))→ nˆ
1
. By construction, nˆ
1
∈ N
∞
.
Claim (iii) is that F (nˆ
1
) = 0. Assume nˆ
1
∈ N
∞
, Condition P, and F (nˆ
1
) = 0. It
follows that F (nˆ
1
) > 0 or F (nˆ
1
) < 0. Recall, n
1
(α) = H
α
(F (n
1
)). By deﬁnition, as
α→∞
H
α
(x)→


1 if x > 0
0 if x < 0
1/2 if x = 0
So we have n∗
1
(α) → nˆ
1
∈ {0, 1}. But, assuming Condition P implies F (1) < 0 and
F (0) > 0. Hence, nˆ
1
is not an ME which contradicts our initial assumption. It must
be the case that, with Condition P, F (nˆ
1
) = 0.
Note now that Lemma 5 establishes nˆ
1
is the unique point where F (nˆ
1
) = 0.
Thus, we conclude that Condition P implies n∗
1
(α)→ nˆ
1
where F (nˆ
1
) = 0.
A similar argument establishes parts (2) and (3) of the proposition. Note that
Condition P1 implies F (1) > 0 and F (0) > 0 and Condition P0 has F (1) < 0 and
F (0) < 0. The monotonicity of F means that ∀n
1
, α F (n
1
(α)) = 0 and the result
follows immediately from above.
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Figure 1:  T-map for various values of α and f =2. 
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Figure 2.  T-map for various values of α and f=2 for the case of no Intrinsic Heterogeneity and 
predictor 1 homogeneity. 
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Figure 3.  T-map for α=2000 and f=.5,1,2,5,10,20 for the case of Intrinsic Heterogeneity.  Note 
that as f increases the fixed point of the T-map. 
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Figure 4.  Real-time learning simulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
